Landmark Judgments of Supreme Court of India : 2020
1. Equal share should be given to daughter in coparcenary property
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 3717: AIROnline 2020 SC 676
ARUN MISHRA, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND M.R. SHAH, JJ.
The daughter is treated as a coparcener in the same manner as a son by birth with the same rights in coparcenary property and liabilities, even if the father died before the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The effect of the amendment is that a daughter is made coparcener, with effect from the date of amendment and she can claim partition also, which is a necessary concomitant of the coparcenary. As the right is by birth and not by dint of inheritance, it is irrelevant that a coparcener whose daughter is conferred with the rights is alive or not. Conferral is not based on the death of a father or other coparcener.
Decision of Supreme Court in AIR 2016 SC 769 and in (2018) 15 SCC 662 holding that S.6 as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is prospective in operation, and it applies when both coparceners and his daughter were alive on the date of commencement of Amendment Act was held erroneous and overruled
Further decision of Supreme Court in AIR 2018 SC 721 to the extent it held provisions of S. 6 of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act to be of prospective application was held erroneous and partly overruled
2. Homebuyer can approach consumer fora as well as RERA
AIROnline 2020 SC 822
Discretion is given to homebuyers/allottees to approach consumer forum as well as to initiate proceedings under Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act in case builder fails to deliver a real estate project in time. Insofar as cases where such proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act are initiated after the provisions of the RERA Act came into force, there is nothing in the RERA Act which bars such initiation. Merely because registration is valid upto certain date, entitlement of homebuyers/allottees to maintain action against builder does not stand deferred. Period in which construction should have been completed has to be reckoned in terms of Builder Buyer agreement and not registration.
3.“Gowari” is not part of Scheduled Tribe “Gond Gowari”
AIROnline 2020 SC 896
The power to include or exclude, amend or alter the Presidential Order is expressly and exclusively conferred on and vested with the Parliament and Courts cannot and should not extend jurisdiction to deal with the question as to whether a particular caste or sub-caste or group or part of tribe is included in any one of the entries mentioned in the Presidential Order. In view of the ratio of judgments of Supreme Court Court, the conclusion is inescapable that the High Court could not have entertained the claim or looked into the evidences to find out and decide that tribe “Gowari” is part of Scheduled Tribe “Gond Gowari”, which is included in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.
4. ‘OBC and SC Female Category’ candidates having secured more marks than secured by last candidate appointed in ‘General Category-Female’ can be considered against posts meant for ‘General Category- Female’ on basis of their own merit.
AIROnline 2020 SC 906
At the stage of accommodating candidates for effecting horizontal reservation, the candidates from reserved categories can be adjusted only against their own categories under the concerned vertical reservation and not against the “Open or General Category”. It may lead to a situation where, while making adjustment for horizontal reservation in Open or General Category seats, less meritorious candidates may be adjusted. Admittedly, the last selected candidates in Open General female category while making adjustment of horizontal reservation had secured lesser marks than the Applicants. The claim of the Applicants was disregarded on the ground that they could claim only and only if there was a vacancy or chance for them to be accommodated in their respective column of vertical reservation.
While dealing with horizontal reservation contrary view taken by Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh High Court that after vertical reservations provided for, at the stage of accommodating candidates for effecting horizontal reservation, the candidates from reserved categories can be adjusted only against their own categories under the concerned vertical reservation and not against the “Open or General Category” was not approved by Supreme Court.
5. Summary Eviction Procedure under Senior Citizens Act
AIROnline 2020 SC 897
Right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by adopting summary eviction procedure under Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act. Act promulgated with view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. However, overriding effect for remedies sought by applicants under S.3 of Act, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.
6. Grant of Interim Bail to Editor-in-Chief of News Channel
AIROnline 2020 SC 845
Dr. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.
Courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum -the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court -to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum -the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment. Courts must ensure that they continue to remain the first line of defense against the deprivation of the liberty of citizens. Deprivation of liberty even for a single day is one day too many. In considering application under Art.226, the High Court must be circumspect in exercising its powers on the basis of the facts of each case. However, the High Court should not foreclose itself from the exercise of the power when a citizen has been arbitrarily deprived of their personal liberty in an excess of state power. In this batch of cases, a prima facie evaluation of the FIR does not establish the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC. The appellants are residents of India and do not pose a flight risk during the investigation or the trial. There is no apprehension of tampering of evidence or witnesses. Taking these factors into consideration, the order envisaged the release of the appellants on bail. The specific case of the appellant is that he has been targeted because his opinions on his television channel are unpalatable to authority. Whether the appellant has established a case for quashing the FIR is something on which the High Court will take a final view when the proceedings are listed before it but in failing to make even a prima facie evaluation of the FIR, the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty and function as a protector of liberty.
7. Woman has right of residence in shared household of in-laws
AIROnline 2020 SC
Shared household cannot only be that household which is household of joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of aggrieved person has share. Shared household referred to in S.2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is the shared household of aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living including the nature of household have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not. Provisions of Act grants an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the shared household irrespective of her having any legal interest in the same or not.
Further order of two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 2007 SC 1118 holding that the wife is entitled only to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member was held to be erroneous and overruled.
8.Confessional Statement under NDPS Act is not admissible
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 5592 : AIROnline 2020 SC 798
Supreme Court by 2:1 majority held that officers invested with powers under S. 53 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act are “police officers” within meaning of S. 25 of Evidence Act. Any confessional statement made to them would be barred under S. 25 of Evidence Act and cannot be used as confessional statement in trial of offence under NDPS Act. The officer who is designated under S. 53 of NDPS Act can, by a legal fiction, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station, or can be given the powers of an officer in charge of a police station to investigate the offences under the NDPS Act. Whether he is deemed as an officer in charge of a police station, or given such powers, are only different sides of the same coin - the aforesaid officer is not, in either circumstance, a police officer who belongs to the police force of the State. To concede that a deeming fiction would give full powers of investigation, including the filing of a final report, to the designated officer, as against the powers of an officer in charge of a police station being given to a designated officer having only limited powers to investigate, does not stand to reason, and would be contrary to the express language and intendment of S.53 (1) of NDPS Act.
Supreme Court in its minority view stated that any statement made or document or other thing given to an authorised officer referred to in S. 42 of the NDPS Act or an officer invested under S. 53 with the powers of an Officer in Charge for the purpose of investigation of an offence under the said Act, in the course of any inquiry, investigation or other proceeding, may be tendered in evidence in the trial of an offence under the said Act and proved in accordance with law.
Further Order of Division Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 2008 SC 1044 and AIR 1991 SC 45 holding that an Officer vested with powers of Officer in charge of a police station under S.53 of NDPS Act is not police officer within meaning of S.25 of Evidence Act and Statement made by accused under S.67 of NDPS Act can be used as confession against him was erroneous and overruled.
9. Grant of default bail and extension of time for investigation can be considered together
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 5245 : AIROnline 2020 SC 785
Application for default bail and any application for extension of time made by the Public Prosecutor can be considered together in situations where the Public Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of time prior to the filing of the application for default bail by the accused. In such a situation, notwithstanding the fact that the period for completion of investigation has expired, both applications would have to be considered together. However, where the accused has already applied for default bail, the Prosecutor cannot defeat the enforcement of his indefeasible right by subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint or report seeking extension of time.
Further order of two Judge Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 755 holding that “even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before consideration of the same and before being released on bail, the said right to be released on bail would be lost” or “can only be on merits” was overruled.
10. Certificate under S. 65-B (4) of Evidence Act is necessary for admitting electronic evidence
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 4908: AIROnline 2020 SC 641
Certificate required under S. 65-B (4) of Evidence Act is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as S. 65-B (4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. S. 65-B (4) clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render S. 65-B (4) otiose.
Order of Division Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 2018 SC (Supp) 168 and (2018) 2 SCC 801 holding that party who is not in possession of device which has produced an electronic document cannot be required to produce a certificate under S.65B(4) of Evidence Act is overruled. Also order of Madras High Court in 2016 Cri LJ 1542 (Mad) holding that evidence aliunde, that is outside S. 65B of Evidence Act can be taken in order to make electronic records admissible is overruled.
Further order of three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in AIR 2015 SC (Supp) 412 that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under S. 65 of Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible is held per incuriam.
11. Indefinite internet suspension in J.&K by State Govt. not appreciated
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 1308 : AIROnline 2020 SC 17
Complete broad suspension of telecom services, be it internet or otherwise, being a drastic measure, must be considered by the State only if “necessary “and “unavoidable”. Freedom of trade and commerce and freedom of speech and expression through the medium of the internet is also constitutionally protected under Art. 19(1)(g), subject to the restrictions provided under Art.19(6) of Constitution of India. Internet is a very important tool for trade and commerce. The globalization of the Indian economy and the rapid advances in information and technology have opened up vast business avenues and transformed India as a global IT hub. There is no doubt that there are certain trades which are completely dependent on the internet. Such a right of trade through internet also fosters consumerism and availability of choice. Thus when in case of indefinite internet suspension in J.&K, State opposed to selective access to internet services based on lack of technology, then acceptance of plea of State would result in free pass to Government to put complete internet blockage every time. Such complete blocking/prohibition perpetually would not be permissible.
12. Court can quash cases of atrocity against SC and ST
AIR 2020 SC 1036 : AIROnline 2020 SC 225
If the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (33 of 1989) the bar created by section 18 and 18A (I) of the Act shall not apply. The court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under S. 482 Cr.PC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters.
13. Acquisition proceeings would not stand lapsed if the award is not made on date of commencement of Act of 2013
AIR 2020 SC 1496 : AIROnline 2020 SC 346
The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.
14. Multiple and successive FIRs in multiple States bearing same foundation against TV Anchor is quashed because it will destroy freedom of citizen to know the affairs of governance
AIR 2020 SC 2386 : AIROnline 2020 SC 546
The exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Art. 19(1) (a). The petitioner is a media journalist. The airing of views on television shows which he hosts is in the exercise of his fundamental right to speech and expression under Art. 19(1) (a). The exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Art. 19(2). But to allow a journalist to be subjected to multiple complaints and to the pursuit of remedies traversing multiple states and jurisdictions when faced with successive FIRs and complaints bearing the same foundation has a stifling effect on the exercise of that freedom. This will effectively destroy the freedom of the citizen to know of the affairs of governance in the nation and the right of the journalist to ensure an informed society. The right of a journalist under Art. 19(1) (a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express. But one cannot exist without the other. All FIRs in respect of the same incident constitute a clear abuse of process and must be quashed.
15. Domestic award can set aside on ground of patent illegality
AIR 2020 SC 2488 : AIROnline 2020 SC 559
Patent illegality is a ground available under statute for setting aside a domestic award, if decision of arbitrator is found to be perverse, or, so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same; or, the construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. An arbitral award can be set aside under S.34 if it is patently illegal or perverse. No reasonable person could have arrived at a different conclusion while interpreting Clauses 2.7 and 3.4 of the BoQ and Clauses 32(ii) (a) and 33(iii) of the Conditions of Contract. Any other interpretation of clauses would definitely be irrational and in defiance of all logic.
16. Public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied for indefinite period.
AIR 2020 SC 4704 : AIROnline 2020 SC 757
Mode and manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self- ruled democracy. Right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1) (a) and right to assemble peacefully without arms under Article 19(1) (b), are subject to reasonable restrictions, which, inter alia, pertain to interests of sovereignty and integrity of India and public order, and to the regulation by concerned police authorities in this regard. However, while appreciating existence of right to peaceful protest against a legislation, it is made clear that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied in such a manner and that too indefinitely. Democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in designated places alone. Such kind of occupation of public ways, whether at the site in question or anywhere else for protests is not acceptable and the administration ought to take action to keep areas clear of encroachments or obstructions.
17. Offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be a heinous offence
AIR 2020 SC 405 : AIROnline 2020 SC 18
An offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be a heinous offence. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz., offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as ‘serious offences’ within the meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly till the Parliament takes the call on the matter.
18. Anticipatory bail should not invariably be limited to fixed period
AIR 2020 SC 831 : AIROnline 2020 SC 74
Duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.
19.Trustee of Deemed University are included definition of "public servant"
AIR 2020 SC 2203 : AIROnline 2020 SC 487
The purpose under the Prevention of Corruption Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, it cannot be stated that a "Deemed University" and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein. Hence High Court was incorrect in holding that a "Deemed University" is excluded from the ambit of the term "University" under Section 2(c) (xi) of the P.C. Act.
20. Right of accused to get default bail cannot be restricted due to lock down
AIR 2020 SC 2921 : AIROnline 2020 SC 607
Neither Supreme Court can be held to have eclipsed the time prescribed under S.167 (2) of Cr.P.C. nor the restrictions which have been imposed during the lockdown announced by the Government shall operate as any restriction on the rights of an accused as protected by S. 167(2) regarding his indefeasible right to get a default bail on non-submission of charge sheet within the time prescribed.
21. Accused becomes entitled to copies of statements of victim and documents only after taking of cognizance of case and issuance of process and not merely after filing of charge-sheet
AIR 2020 SC 4903 : AIROnline 2020 SC 766
It is only after taking of the cognizance and issuance of process that the accused is entitled, in terms of Sections 207 and 208 of the Code, to copies of the documents referred to in said provisions. The filing of the charge-sheet by itself, does not entitle an accused to copies of any of the relevant documents including statement under Section 164 of the Code, unless the stages indicated above are undertaken.
22. Period of limitation for filing petition for enforcement of foreign award is three years from when right to apply accrues
AIR 2020 SC 4550 : AIROnline 2020 SC 744
Article 136 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable for the enforcement / execution of a foreign award, since it is not a decree of a civil court in India. The enforcement of a foreign award as a deemed decree of the concerned High Court would be covered by the residuary provision i.e. Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the period of limitation for filing a petition for enforcement of a foreign award under Sections 47 and 49, would be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which prescribes a period of three years from when the right to apply accrues.
23. Quantity of neutral substances is not to be excluded while determining “small or commercial quantity” of narcotic drug or psychotropic substance
AIR 2020 SC 3255 : AIROnline 2020 SC 489
In case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substances, the quantity of neutral substances is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances;
24. Court to award maintenance from date of filing application after considering financial capacity of husband and standard of living of wife
AIROnline 2020 SC 915
While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings. Parties may lead oral and documentary evidence with respect to income, expenditure, standard of living, etc. before the concerned Court, for fixing the permanent alimony payable to the spouse. The duration of the marriage would be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for determining the permanent alimony to be paid. The expenses would be determined by taking into account the financial position of the husband and the customs of the family. If there are any trust funds/investments created by any spouse/grandparents in favor of the children, this would also be taken into consideration while deciding the final child support. The test for determination of maintenance in matrimonial disputes depends on the financial status of the respondent, and the standard of living that the applicant was accustomed to in her matrimonial home. In order to prevent a dependent from being reduced to destitution, it is necessary that maintenance is awarded from the date on which the application for maintenance is filed before the concerned Court.
25. In case of abduction followed by murder, Court can presume that abductor is murderer
AIR 2020 SC 3327 : AIROnline 2020 SC 575
Abduction followed by murder in appropriate cases can enable a court to presume that the abductor is the murderer. Now the principle is that after abduction, the abductor would be in a position to explain what happened to his victim and if he failed to do so, it is only natural and logical that an irresistible inference may be drawn that he has done away with the hapless victim. S. 106 of the Evidence Act would come to the assistance of the prosecution. The aforesaid principle would also apply to those persons who illegally confine the person who stands abducted even if there is no evidence that they have themselves carried out the abduction.
26. Recovery of “occupied” property refers to actual physical occupation of property
AIR 2020 SC 3274 : AIROnline 2020 SC 266
When recovery of property is to be made by an owner under S. 14(1)(d), such recovery would be of property that is "occupied by" a corporate debtor. The expression "occupied by" would mean or be synonymous with being in actual physical possession of or being actually used by, in contra-distinction to the expression "possession", which would connote possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical possession. Hence it is clear that S. 14(1) (d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, when it speaks about recovery of property "occupied", does not refer to rights or interests created in property but only actual physical occupation of the property.
27. Deemed Purchaser cannot be said to be the ‘owner’ under Motor Vehicles Act
AIR 2020 SC 3149 : AIROnline 2020 SC 596
Had ownership of the truck involved in accident intended to be transferred forthwith, the registration would have been transferred in the name of the transferee, as also the permit to operate the said truck for carriage of goods. It is difficult to accept that a person who has transferred the ownership of a goods carriage vehicle on receipt of consideration, would not report the transfer or apply for transfer of registration, and thereby continue to incur the risks and liabilities of ownership of the vehicle under the provisions of law including in particular, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and other criminal/penal laws. In view of the definition of 'owner' in S. 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Appellant remained the owner of the said truck on the date of the accident and the Insurer could not have avoided its liability for the losses suffered by the owner on the ground of transfer of ownership to purchaser.
Author Name: Ravi Kankar, Senior Editor
